Fund management and governance by McAllister, Pat
Fund management and governance 
Book or Report Section 
Accepted Version 
McAllister, P. (2018) Fund management and governance. In: 
MacGregor, B. D., Schulz, R. and Green, R. (eds.) Routledge 
Companion to Real Estate Investment. Routledge, Abingdon. 
ISBN 9781138020788 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/84653/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work.  See Guidance on citing .
Publisher: Routledge 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
1 
 
Chapter 17 – Fund management and governance 
 
Pat McAllister 
 
Henley Business School, University of Reading, UK 
 
Introduction 
 
In recent decades, poor or weak governance has been associated with many of the major 
scandals in the financial sector. Whilst there are numerous notorious examples in consumer 
finance (e.g. insurance, mortgage and pensions mis-selling in the UK), global investment 
banking (e.g. LIBOR rate fixing, biased stock advice during the dot.com bubble, money 
laundering) accounting and auditing practices (e.g. Arthur Anderson), corporate malpractices 
(e.g., Enron and WorldCom in the US, Olympus in Japan), such high profile cases have perhaps 
provided rather extreme examples of governance failures as well as involving criminal and 
fraudulent behaviour.  Part of the explanation of the now infamous collapses of multiple major 
banks and other financial institutions in the global financial crisis (e.g. Royal Bank of Scotland 
in the UK, Anglo-Irish Bank in the Republic of Ireland, Lehmans and Bear Stearns in the US) 
has also been attributed to problems of corporate governance. 
 
Whilst disentangling the causes of such major corporate failures can be complex, unethical 
and/or self-interested behaviour tend to be pervasive problems for and in organisations who 
are managing resources or funds on behalf others. Principal-agent and moral hazard problems 
have long been a noted feature of situations where individuals who act either as employees, 
advisors or managers are paid to use their efforts, to provide advice to or to act on behalf of 
another. Conflicts of interest can commonly arise since company directors, fund managers or 
external advisors are paid professionals with their own interests which may not necessarily be 
aligned with the interests of “principals”. However, in a fund management context such 
conflicts of interest can be numerous and varied and can be hard to delimit. In a speech in 2012, 
the US Securities Exchange Commission’s Director for the Office of Compliance Inspections 
and Examinations highlighted that: 
 
“Conflicts of interest exist throughout the commercial world. They are a 
particularly important challenge for large and complex financial institutions, which 
can have affiliations that lead to a host of potential conflicts of interest. If these are 
not carefully managed, this then leads to failure to protect the client’s interests, with 
attendant regulatory and reputational risks that could be disastrous.”  
 
In the fund management sector, key issues tend to concern how funds and their boards (the 
clients of the fund manager) are informed of procedures for dealing with conflicts of interest, 
how such conflicts are handled and reported. In the funds themselves, board members, trustees 
and/or directors many also have conflicts of interest which may need to be recognised, recorded 
and supervised. Where asset management is outsourced, side-by-side arrangements involving 
the management of a number of accounts can create conflicts of interest where an investment 
manager may favour one account over another. Potential problems can occur where different 
fee structures may incentivise managers to prioritise certain clients. If the manager has co-
invested in only some funds, there are clear incentives to favour the funds where they have 
more ‘skin in the game’. Whilst less likely in illiquid real estate markets, investment strategies 
for one client may affect the performance of other clients. Cross-trading between clients also 
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needs to be managed. Many approaches can be used to resolve such conflicts. With a range of 
costs and benefits, they can include firm or team specific trading strategies, creating ‘silos’ that 
limit information sharing about clients, mandatory consultation with compliance teams or 
oversight groups. As we shall see below, a primary concern of governance is with ensuring that 
the costs and risks potentially created by such conflicts of interest are minimised. 
 
Although poor, negligent and sometime fraudulent real estate lending practices have been 
significant in headline making corporate banking scandals, a number of high profile 
governance failures have also occurred in the commercial real estate investment sector. Early 
in the 2000s, the so-called ‘Frankfurt real estate scandal’ involved a whole range of problems 
including systematic bribery of fund managers by real estate developers, architects and 
construction companies in order to obtain contracts and/or buy buildings on corrupt terms. For 
instance, buyers and sellers of real estate assets were found to have engaged the services of real 
estate agents after a sale was completed and to have then split the agent's fee among themselves. 
It was also suggested that bribes were paid among fund management organisations to corruptly 
influence the outcome and level of bids in sales transactions. In 2007-8 in the Netherlands, the 
Philips pension fund was investigated by the Dutch regulator. Sixteen real estate professionals 
were arrested and accused of being involved in an illegal scheme believed to have cost the 
Philips pension fund millions of Euros. The investigation focused on fraudulent real estate 
transactions involving internal asset managers agreeing relatively low values for assets with 
external valuers, before properties were sold to business connections. The properties were then 
later ‘flipped’ for the market value, with the price difference being divided between the 
participants. Of course, these examples are fairly extreme. In reality, individual and 
organisational self-interested actions will tend to be more subtle and nuanced. However, whilst 
the individuals themselves remain primarily culpable, the organisational decision-making and 
risk management processes that ‘permitted’ such behaviours are the essence of governance in 
the commercial real estate investment sector. 
 
While the scope of these terms has been mutating and is contested, governance related issues 
are often central to the bundle of interrelated factors that are increasingly used to measure the 
ethical performance of businesses. In the last two decades, a plethora of acronyms such as ESG 
(Environmental, Social and Governance), CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility), RPI 
(Responsible Property Investment) and SRI (Socially Responsible Investment) have become 
increasingly mainstream within the real estate investment community. In this chapter, we 
explore how governance issues affect real estate investment markets and processes. In terms of 
outcomes, the empirical evidence on the relationship between governance performance and 
financial performance is reviewed. In the first section, the concept of governance is discussed 
and its key dimensions are identified. This is followed by a brief examination of the real estate 
investment sector identifying some of the key areas that need to be ‘governed’. Specific areas 
where governance issues emerge in real estate management, brokerage, appraisal and unlisted 
real estate fund management are discussed. There is, then, a discussion of the evidence and 
expectations regarding governance and investment performance in the listed real estate sector. 
Finally, conclusions are drawn. 
 
Concepts of governance 
 
The concept of governance is used in a wide range of contexts and has been described as a 
broad term that “can convey a slightly different meaning depending on who uses it” (Aubut, 
2004, p.8). From a broad socio-political perspective, governance broadly concerns the rules 
and structures that societies use to organise themselves. Terms such as power, accountability, 
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stakeholders, control, decision-making, authority, interests, risk management, equity and 
transparency tend to be central to theorisations of governance. On their website (https://iog.ca/), 
The Institute on Governance succinctly state that “Governance determines who has power, who 
makes decisions, how other players make their voice heard and how account is rendered”. More 
specifically, corporate governance is concerned with: 
 
“the system of rules, practices and processes by which a company is directed and 
controlled. Corporate governance essentially involves balancing the interests of the 
many stakeholders in a company – these include its shareholders, management, 
customers, suppliers, financiers, government and the community. Since corporate 
governance also provides the framework for attaining a company's objectives, it 
encompasses practically every sphere of management, from action plans and 
internal controls to performance measurement and corporate disclosure.” 
 
The emphasis is then on the framework of procedures, regulations and guidelines by which 
senior management ensure accountability, equity and transparency in relationships with 
stakeholders such as employees, investors, suppliers and customers. This framework will often 
need to involve practices for managing the sometimes diverging interests of stakeholders. Its 
scope is influenced by different types of informal and formal contractual arrangements between 
companies and their stakeholders to configure the distribution of obligations and rewards. The 
basics of corporate governance structures consist of a board of directors who appoint managers 
and external auditors who are responsible for a range of decisions on disclosure of information 
to shareholders, board members and the public, remuneration of senior managers, and 
supervisory structures. 
 
‘Demand’ for governance in the commercial real estate investment sector, like any other 
investment sector, is related to the largely inevitable incompleteness of contracts between the 
various stakeholders. Since it is usually not possible to fully allocate financial surpluses in 
every possible contingency, particularly in outsourced structures, contract incompleteness can 
create scope for opportunistic behaviour. Such problems tend to be exacerbated by the larger 
degree of asymmetric information. It is an inability to contractualise all possible contingencies 
that creates the need for some type of governance process. Rajan and Zingales (1998) identified 
two necessary conditions for a governance system to be needed. First, the relationship must 
generate some potential for abnormal gains from the transaction. Second, the abnormal gains 
are not perfectly allocated in advance. Without specific contractual terms, outcomes respecting 
the distribution of potential gains has to be determined during the period of the contract. This 
is essentially the role of the governance process. 
 
In order to inhibit “agents” from taking decisions that favour their own interests, organisations 
tend to introduce checks and balances. Often attempts to achieve some element of separation 
of powers are at the core of governance. The emphasis of ‘internal (my italics) governance’ 
tends to focus on setting organisations’ objectives, risk control, organisational structure, the 
allocation of authority and responsibility, reporting lines, compliance and internal auditing. For 
instance, covering the financial services sector Article 22 of Directive 2006/48/EC, requires 
that: 
 
“every credit institution has robust governance arrangements, which include a clear 
organisational structure with well defined, transparent and consistent lines of 
responsibility, effective processes to identify, manage, monitor and report the risks 
it is or might be exposed to, adequate internal control mechanisms, including sound 
4 
 
administrative and accounting procedures, and remuneration policies and practices 
that are consistent with and promote sound and effective risk management” 
 
Clearly, the potential scope of governance is wide-ranging and contextual. The relative 
importance of the various dimensions of governance will vary with the nature of the 
relationships or processes that are being governed. 
 
Governance and the real estate sector 
 
Like most business sectors, the real estate sector can be analysed as a network of relationships, 
contracts, knowledge, capital and assets. Although in most real estate markets and with marked 
variations, a large proportion of real estate is owner-occupied, in many countries a substantial 
proportion of commercial real estate is owned directly by investors or indirectly by investors 
in various “pass-through” vehicles as a quasi-financial asset. These pass-through vehicles such 
as REITs and unlisted real estate funds are essentially asset management organisations. An 
important market shift in the last two decades has been the transformation in the range and 
scope of real estate investment organisations and their support service providers. In addition to 
the longstanding occupational pension funds, insurance companies and listed real estate 
companies, many of whom have themselves evolved significantly, relatively new categories of 
real estate investment organisations have become increasingly prominent. Sovereign wealth 
funds, specialist open and closed end real estate funds, investment banks, specialist real estate 
investment managers, private equity groups and endowments funds have emerged as 
significant market participants. Whilst sometimes engaging in real estate development, their 
core activities tend to focus on the assembly and management of portfolio of tenanted real 
estate assets. 
 
Each type of real estate organisation will be exposed to different types of operational risk – the 
risk of losses stemming from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or 
from external events – and will, therefore, focus on different aspects of governance. Whilst the 
boundaries between the different sub-sectors can be blurred as they sometimes attempt to enter 
their competitors’ markets, it is clear that the real estate investment sector comprises a variety 
of market operators with a range of different time horizons, investment objectives, client types, 
and business models. This diversity of asset managers and asset holders reflects the 
proliferation of intermediation in the investment chain. An array of intermediaries – nominees, 
‘fund of fund’ managers, investment consultants, distributors, asset and property managers, 
appraisers – are part of the network of real estate investment principals and advisors that require 
internal and external governance. Both occupiers and investors need to procure a range of real 
estate support services from third parties in order to hold real estate assets. Whilst many 
organisations will deliver some support services ‘in-house’, acting for both investors and 
occupiers there is a sector of third party real estate services providers to whom many real estate 
support functions are outsourced. The main types include a wide range of real estate 
management, legal, brokerage and appraisal services. These organisations are important in that 
they are often the ‘instruments’ through which real estate investment policies are executed. 
 
The nature of the governance issues pertinent to real estate investment will also be affected by 
the method of real estate investment. REITs and listed real estate companies share most of the 
regulatory and governance regimes with the broader listed sector. In the literature on REIT 
governance, the emphasis has consequently been on ‘standard’ governance variables such as 
board independence, disclosure, and insider ownership. Unlisted real estate funds represent one 
of the fastest growing real estate investment routes over the last two decades. They are often 
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called ‘private’ funds since they are not quoted on any public exchanges. There are a large 
number of different fund structures which are based in a wide range of regulatory jurisdictions. 
As a result, it can be difficult to categorise and classify many of the funds in the unlisted sector. 
Across global real estate markets, there is a large array of unlisted, private vehicles (e.g. limited 
partnerships, trusts, private companies) with different legal structures in a range of regulatory 
domiciles that are used to pool real estate assets. After discussing some of the governance-
related issues that can emerge in acquiring and holding real estate assets, we then look at 
governance issues in the unlisted and listed sectors in more depth. 
 
Governance issues in the real estate management process 
 
Like many other business sectors professional and industry body regulations are common 
elements of governance in the real estate sector. Professional bodies typically set standards of 
professional qualifications and practice and maintain databases of qualified persons. They 
confer the appropriate designations; provide guidance on conduct and practice, investigate 
grievances and misconduct penalties. Internationally, there are a variety of models for 
governing professional organisations who, in turn, are themselves part of the range of 
governance regimes that monitor and supervise real estate professionals. In the UK, and in a 
growing number of other international real estate markets, the Royal Institution of Chartered 
Surveyors (RICS) has been the most prominent professional body. There is an ongoing debate 
within the European Union about the balances between local and international regulation, state 
and voluntary self-regulation. In the UK, there has been a long tradition of professional self-
regulation. The RICS is a good example of a self-regulating profession in the real estate sector. 
Whilst it is independent, significant changes to its constitution have to be ratified by the UK 
Government. The membership of The European Association of Real Estate Professionals 
provides a good database of the main professional associations in Europe. 
 
In 2014, the RICS released the Real Estate Management Code. Many of the key principles of 
the code echo the governance concerns that are found in other areas. A number of the key 
principles are outlined. Real estate managers should: 
 
“ensure that clients are provided with terms of engagement which are fair and clear, 
incorporate details of complaints handling procedures [...] do the utmost to avoid 
conflicts of interest and, where they do arise, to deal with them openly, fairly and 
promptly […] ensure that all communications are fair, clear, timely and transparent 
in all dealings with clients […] ensure that any client money is held separately from 
other monies, and is covered by adequate insurance.” 
 
Many of the themes in governance can be seen in apparently prosaic issues such as services 
charges (Common Area Maintenance fees in the US). Problems can arise from a basic conflict 
of interest between the owner’s concern with maintaining the property in the long term and the 
occupier’s shorter term perspective. The tenant typically does not want to pay for works from 
which they may derive little benefit. Not least because they may intend to vacate. In addition, 
compounding the misaligned incentives problem, the owner is typically spending the 
occupiers’ money and may have little incentive to ensure ‘best value’. A number of problems 
have occurred: 
 
 Use of service charge income on capital expenditure to improve rather than maintain 
the asset. 
 Poor procurement practices and failure to procure ‘best value’ providers of services. 
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 Failure to pass on commissions obtained on insurance policies to the occupiers. 
 Where the service charge is ‘bundled’ with rent in a single payment, owners provide 
poor quality services in order to maximise their income. 
 Inadequate justification of expenditure by the owner and/or poor transparency in 
costings. 
 
The key issue requiring robust governance was summed up in a legal case in the UK. The judge 
stated that: 
 
“Tenants who agree to service charge clauses […] rely upon the professional people 
involved performing their roles with professional scrupulousness, diligence, 
integrity and independence and not in a partisan spirit, supposing their only task to 
be to recover as much money as they can for the landlord.” (Princes House Ltd v 
Distinctive Clubs Ltd 2006) 
 
The RICS Code of Practice for service charges in commercial property has become a key 
mechanism through which the service charge process is governed. It provides lengthy and 
specific guidance on a wide range of service charge issues. However, it is well summed up in 
the introductory section which states that: 
 
“In incurring costs in the provision of services, the manager is spending the 
occupiers’ money. Managers are therefore expected to demonstrate a high degree 
of competence, professionalism, integrity, diligence, objectivity and transparency 
in dealing with the service charge accounts.” (RICS 2014, p.6) 
 
A key decision for investors in real estate investment portfolios is how to structure their 
procurement and delivery of property management – specifically whether to deliver in-house 
or to outsource to property management service providers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, 
over the last two decades, it has become increasingly common for real estate investment 
organisations to outsource property management which many have come to regard as a non-
core activity. Like many outsourcing arrangements, operational risks generated by principal 
agent issues have meant that the governance of this type of interfirm relationships has tended 
to involve a wide range of highly contractualised, control mechanisms. Outsourced property 
management agreements are used to set out in detail the specification of the service, pricing 
and financial performance penalties (or incentives), service levels and performance metrics, 
delegated decision rights and responsibilities, conflict resolution procedures and provisions for 
contract termination. For UK funds, key performance indicators – such as percentage of rent 
collected within three days of due date or percentage of service charge collected within three 
days of due date – tend to be the main mechanism of monitoring performance. In a market 
characterised by a limited number of large scale services providers, information leakage is an 
issue and investors/fund managers – themselves prone to conflict of interest problems – have 
had to ensure that they are comfortable with internal confidentiality procedures put in place by 
their providers who are often delivering similar services to other real estate investment 
organisations. 
 
Governance issues in the real estate acquisition process 
 
Buying and selling commercial real estate assets involves a process of exchange that occurs 
over an extended period and incurs risks and costs of a character and order that differ from 
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those involved when trading mainstream equity and debt securities. This stems from the private 
and dispersed nature of commercial real estate markets and the fact that real estate assets are 
heterogeneous, with varying physical, spatial and legal characteristics. Buyers normally have 
to spend significantly more time searching for suitable assets and sellers normally must spend 
time attracting buyers. Often there are a range of professionals working in different 
organisations involved in the real estate stock selection and acquisition process – fund 
managers, researchers, asset managers, brokers and acquisition specialists. Individuals 
influencing stock selection and pricing decisions will be prone to different pressures and have 
a range of motivations which may, in turn, bias their actions and advice both consciously and 
unconsciously. For instance, Graff and Webb (1997) explain return persistence in real estate 
assets as a consequence of agency costs arising from incentives (bonuses, fee structures) for 
managers to acquire assets and to overbid for rarely available assets. In the UK, Gallimore, et 
al. (2008) identified a number of potential problems that investing organisations need to 
consider in governing real estate asset acquisition processes. 
 
 Employed by third party firms, brokers acting for investors may be primarily motivated 
to generate fees from transactions rather than to ensure appropriate asset selection and 
pricing by their clients. 
 Internally employed individuals who are responsible for the buying process for their 
investment organisation may be incentivised to acquire high quantities of stock rather 
than the high quality stock at appropriate prices.  
 Fund managers who are remunerated on the basis of portfolio size may be incentivised 
to acquire assets in order to increase the size of the portfolio under management and, 
consequently, increase the size of their fee income. 
 Fund managers often have to decide how to allocate high quality assets offered to them 
among different clients and may allocate assets to maximise benefits to themselves or 
their organisation rather than to their clients.  
 
This is essentially a concern with different operational risks within the real estate asset 
acquisition process. Gallimore et al. (2006) concluded that, for large UK investing institutions, 
the real estate investment processes were relatively well governed. The potential for poor 
decision-making at the individual asset level was limited by a number of ‘checks and balances’. 
Institutional buyers tended to be expert and were aware of brokers’ misaligned incentive 
structures. They had, therefore, sufficient knowledge to critically evaluate brokers’ advice. 
Brokers had counterincentives in terms of repeat business and potential reputational damage. 
Within the investing organisations, it was acknowledged that individual buyers should not be 
rewarded by volume of transactions. Their remuneration was normally linked to corporate and 
team performance rather than just individual performance. In addition, the decision-making 
process was invariably joint – initial recommendations and evaluations were closely scrutinised 
by fund managers and/or committees of senior, experienced experts. The central role of joint-
decision-making in controlling operational risks is illustrated in Figure 17.1, which provides a 
schematic representation of the various participants in the real estate acquisition process for 
institutional investors. 
 
[FIGURE 17.1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In institutional investment organisations, systems of consultation and approval are a vital part 
of operational risk management in the stock acquisition process. The fund manager is often the 
key pinch-point in the process. In consultation with the professional responsible for buying 
new stock, the fund manager typically contributes to the evaluation process. This tends to 
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involve oversight of the testing of assumptions and modifications to cash flow models. 
Commonly, once a fund manager decides to pursue an acquisition, there are further formal 
layers of approval in place. Most institutional investment organisations have some form of 
investment committee comprising senior fund managers and, usually, the head of research who 
need to approve proposed acquisitions. Key issues concern how much delegated authority 
should be given to fund managers. These processes and delegated levels of approval are part 
of the investment management mandate agreed with the client. 
 
The amount of client involvement in individual buying decisions will often depend upon the 
investment management agreement and the degree of discretion that this gives. 
 
The demand from investors for high quality stock can produce moral hazard for sellers’ 
brokers. Whilst it is difficult to demonstrate that there are systematic problems, anecdotes exist 
of various poor practices including acting for buyers as well as sellers, accepting inducements 
from buyer’s to provide “inside information” on competitors’ bid levels and/or providing 
biased advice to seller in return for tangible benefits from the buyer. The Investment Property 
Forum’s (IPF) Protocol on Open Market Investment Agency provides a case study of a 
professional self-regulation model to handling conflicts of interest in the brokerage sector. The 
IPF identifies that: 
 
“The potential for conflict of interest has become a fact of modern investment 
agency. Such situations should always be managed proactively and transparently to 
ensure trust and confidentiality is maintained at all times.” (Investment Property 
Forum 2014)  
 
Common governance themes are outlined in the protocol focusing on clarity and fairness in 
terms of engagement, maintenance of conflicts of interest databases and reference to 
complaints-handling procedures and redress schemes. Most of the protocol is concerned with 
multiple introductions (where multiple individual agents in a firm ‘introduce’ an asset to 
multiple potential buyers) and dual agency (where other individual agents from the firm of the 
seller’s agent acts also for the buyer). The protocol emphasises the role of a maintaining a 
barriers policy that seeks to ensure that deal teams from within the same firm acting for 
different clients on the same transaction have strict separation of information flows.  Effective 
from 2018, the RICS released their own Professional Statement on Conflicts of Interest – UK 
Commercial Property Market Investment Agency (RICS, 2017) that addresses similar issues in 
the brokerage sector.   
 
Governance issues in real estate appraisals 
 
With broad implications for interrelated issues such as data quality, approaches to portfolio 
construction strategies and market performance measurement among others, a key feature of 
commercial real estate markets is the requirement for appraisals to act as substitutes for 
observed prices. For listed securities, the price of assets is observable and performance and 
values can be monitored in real-time. In marked contrast, given the absence of continuously 
traded and deep markets, real estate appraisals perform a vital function in real estate markets 
by acting as a surrogate for prices. Appraisers provide key information estimating the trading 
prices of real estate assets. 
 
Appraisals may need to be commissioned for a number of purposes. A proportion consists of 
single, transaction-related appraisals in which the appraisal can be critical to the completion of 
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the transaction. Periodic, repeated appraisals of the same asset tend to take place for investment 
performance measurement and for financial reporting. Typically, they are used as a metric to 
measure financial ratios and fund managers’ bonuses. Clearly, when remuneration is linked to 
investment performance which, in turn, is based on appraisals; there are obvious incentives for 
fund managers to attempt to bias appraisals. Appraisals are also used to set unit pricing for 
unlisted real estate funds where bid and ask prices are set on a net asset value basis. Accurate 
appraisals are particularly crucial to this type of fund manager when demand to redeem units 
is high. In addition, appraisals can be used to assess whether investment funds or real estate 
companies that are geared are compliant with minimum loan-to-value ratios. 
 
Similar to auditors, accountants, equity and rating analysts, real estate appraisers act as 
information intermediaries. In particular, they can add value by providing credible information 
related to financial performance. There is a large body of academic research on information 
intermediaries to suggest that their advice may not always be independent. For example for 
equity analysts, Lin and McNichols (1998) and Michaely and Womack (1999) found that 
analysts’ recommendations were affected by their firm’s business relationship with a company. 
In the real estate literature, there is a body of work that has identified different types of 
influence (coercive, covert, reward, information) of different categories of appraisal 
(transactional, periodic) at different stages of the process (instruction, information collection, 
calculation, reporting and so on). The vast majority of existing research has been either quasi-
experimental (Hansz 2004; Amidu and Aluko 2007; Amidu et al. 2008), interview-based 
(McAllister et al. 2004; Crosby et al. 2004; Levy and Schuck 2005) or postal survey-based 
(Smolen and Hambleton 1997; Worzala et al. 1998; Gallimore and Wolverton 2000; Yu 2002). 
A stylized fact that emerges from this body of work is that appraisals are often not independent. 
 
Most appraisers have anecdotes of attempts by clients to influence the outcome of an appraisal 
and, as noted above, the academic literature is replete with evidence of this influence. The 
appraisal process facilitates high levels of interference by clients. This ranges from the 
selection of the appraisers to the discussion of the outcome at draft appraisal meetings. The 
bonus structures of clients are sometimes based on short term outcomes tied to performance 
targets. Additionally, the fee structure of clients is also often tied to appraisal outcomes. In the 
bank lending sector, there are more stakeholders in addition to the lender such as brokers, other 
professionals and, possibly, providers of insurance, guarantees and indemnities. According to 
Crosby et al. (2010), even though the appraiser should have the aim to produce an objective 
independent valuation, they can be subjected to pressure by other stakeholders in the 
transaction (including the individual banker). They may all have a vested interest in the deal 
going ahead and a lesser interest in the performance of the loan and/or the asset. 
 
This discussion raises issues of internal supervisory relationships within organisations 
including fee structures, appointing and reporting mechanisms between the appraiser and 
client, and professional supervisory processes and their effectiveness. In mature real estate 
markets, the requirements and conduct of appraisals are typically governed by a blend of 
governmental legislation and professional institutions. In the UK, the most important 
professional regulatory body is the RICS, which produces guidance on professional standards. 
The RICS (2012) states that appraiser must act independently and objectively at all times and 
their professional standards provide some examples of threats to their independence or 
objectivity. The valuation standards also identify the particular threat to objectivity of 
communication with a client before a report is produced: 
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“A threat to the valuer’s objectivity can arise where the outcome of a valuation is 
discussed before its completion with either the client or another party with an 
interest in the valuation. While such discussions are not improper, and indeed may 
be beneficial to both the valuer and the client, the valuer must be alert to the 
potential influence that such discussions may have on his or her fundamental duty 
to provide an objective opinion”. (RICS 2012, VS 1.7, para 7)) 
 
Following problems of client influence in appraisals identified in the UK through academic 
research, professional regulatory requirements to record meetings on ‘draft’ appraisals were 
introduced, see Baum et al. (2000). After the Carsberg report in 2002, the RICS developed a 
compliance team to monitor client influence. However, to date we know little about how it is 
operating and whether it is effectively countering any influence issues which remain. 
 
Governance issues in unlisted real estate funds 
 
As noted above, a notable feature of the unlisted real estate sector is the diversity of the 
vehicles. In the UK, investment in unlisted real estate funds is generally undertaken through 
employing one of three legal formats: partnerships, unit trusts or companies. Broadly speaking, 
the range of funds can be seen as lying on a continuum in terms of size, trading volume, number 
of investors, sector focus, gearing and rigour of regulatory framework. The vehicles can range 
from joint ventures – vehicles with two or three investors pooling capital and expertise for a 
fixed period to acquire a clearly defined asset base – towards open-ended property funds with 
a high proportion of retail investors and a large portfolio of assets (in value and number). While 
joint ventures are normally customised towards specific investor needs, retail property funds 
can be highly regulated to decrease investor risk and, as a result, have relatively homogenised 
formats. Such diversity makes it difficult to generalise about the governance issues in unlisted 
real estate funds. 
 
It is also clear that an investment in unlisted real estate funds will have different characteristics 
relative to a direct acquisition of the underlying real estate assets. These characteristics may be 
perceived as both negative and positive. Relative to direct ownership, there are significant 
differences in liquidity, trading and price formation, search costs, financial structuring, holding 
costs, management control, lot size, taxation and transaction costs inter alia. However, just as 
importantly, there will be significant inter-vehicle differences in all of the qualities listed above. 
Most of the unlisted real estate structures have in common the delegation of fund and asset 
management functions to third party managers. Whilst the length and size of the investment 
chain can vary, the result can be a range of potential misalignments of interests that need to be 
‘governed’. 
 
Many of the potential moral hazards are implicit in the European Association for Investors in 
Non-Listed Real Estate Vehicles (INREV) corporate governance guidelines. INREV’s 
corporate governance guidelines provide a useful and comprehensive description of the scope 
of the issues that can fall within the remit of corporate governance in the unlisted funds sector. 
Fuller details can be found in the INREV Guidelines. With apologies for such a lengthy list, 
the broad headings relate to provisions for: 
 
 amendments to the constitutional terms of the fund agreement,  
 handling of defaulting investors,  
 composition of the investment committee,  
 investor approval rights over third party service providers,  
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 vehicle documentation on control mechanisms and risk control 
procedures,  
 codes of ethics,  
 provision for manager removal,  
 the extent, disclosure and pattern of co-investment,  
 voting rights,  
 the existence, composition and powers of a non-executive board, 
 transparency and rights of investors to obtain information,  
 quality and frequency of investment reports,  
 rights to inspect accounts and records,  
 investors' engagement with appraisals;  
 use and appointment of external valuers,  
 the use and disclosure of side letters or agreements,  
 investors’ rights in the event of changes to key personnel,  
 fee and carry structures,  
 protocols for conflicts of interest,  
 exclusivity on investment opportunities and 
 the terms of confidentiality clauses. 
 
Even within some of these broad headings, there can be a numerous ways in which potential 
conflicts of interests between managers and investors need to be governed. 
 
Governance and investment performance in the listed real estate sector 
 
From the conceptual discussion of governance above, it is clear that an expected outcome of 
good governance is expected to be improved financial performance mainly through reduced 
risk and better risk-adjusted performance. Improvements in financial performance can be 
directly linked to rationales for allocating resources to high quality governance. Governance 
has been analysed through a number of theoretical lenses which generate contrasting expected 
relationships between governance performance and business performance. For instance, 
instrumental stakeholder theory stresses the contribution of relationships with key stakeholders 
(other than shareholders) such as employees, suppliers, unions, customers and the local 
community to business performance. Closely related stakeholder–agency theory emphasizes 
how high quality governance can reduce the agency costs within corporate structures by 
improving interest alignment and monitoring of the actions of employers, managers and 
employees. Similarly, firm-as-contract theory also highlights the significance of, often implied, 
contracts with stakeholders as drivers of firms’ financial performance. Hence, the expected 
causal relationship is that the quality of governance should be a determinant of business 
performance. 
 
In contrast, slack resources theory implies the opposite relationship – that business performance 
is a determinant of the quality of governance. It proposes that surpluses generated by strong 
prior business performance release resources for governance activities. While theories are often 
presented as mutually exclusive, it is possible that, similar to issue of motivation, the relative 
importance of resource availability and the salience of relationships with stakeholders may vary 
between sectors or firms and/or over time. Russo and Perrini (2010) reports that firm size is a 
decisive factor and argues that a social capital approach is more relevant for understanding 
governance commitments of SMEs whereas stakeholder theory is more apt for explaining the 
actions of large firms. 
12 
 
 
The mechanism by which a strong commitment to good governance is value adding in terms 
of improved corporate financial performance can be difficult to disentangle. The direct costs 
of allocating capital to governance activities are relatively straightforward to measure. The 
direct costs are associated with the implementation, monitoring and reporting of governance 
processes. Indirect costs are also produced by the rejection of potential profitable business 
opportunities that may conflict with good governance-related objectives. It is not axiomatic 
that benefits are dominated by costs. Analyses of how corporate governance performance 
affects corporate financial performance in terms of returns, risks and company value tend to 
focus on more nebulous (but possibly no less important) factors. Linking back to stakeholder 
and firm-as-contract theories, the arguments for a positive effect on financial performance tend 
to emphasize increases in relational wealth, see Luo and Bhattacharya (2009). Factors broadly 
related to trust, such as increased transparency and reduced information asymmetry, may create 
reputational and branding benefits that improve key relationships with employees, 
shareholders, customers, suppliers and the community. A strong governance commitment 
implies more information about the expected cash flow distribution, reduced principal-agent 
costs and lower investors’ risk premium. More directly, the cost of capital may be reduced as 
well-governed firms may be prepared to place a lower risk premium on well-governed 
businesses. 
 
Clientele effects are another possible mechanism by which governance performance may lead 
to a range of different effects on prices, returns and risk. The key transmission mechanism is 
that a decrease in the size of the investor base produces a neglect effect associated with 
exclusionary screening, lower demand for interests in poorly governed investments, a 
consequent negative effect on prices and a positive effect on returns. The body of work on the 
performance of securitized SRI funds is broadly consistent with underperformance in terms of 
returns (Bauer et al. 2005; Geczy et al. 2005; Renneboog et al. 2008). The outcomes are a 
higher cost of capital and lower security prices for ‘sin’ stocks, albeit their returns can be 
higher. Another strand in this argument focuses on the role of differences in investor beliefs 
about the expected performance of well and poorly governed investments. One argument is 
that that good corporate social performance sends a signal of high quality management. 
 
In the listed real estate sector, transparency and disclosure in financial reporting have been 
highlighted as key governance issues. Creating potential adverse selection problems, a lack of 
transparent financial information can result in greater information risks for investors who, in 
turn, experience increased uncertainty about the true economic value of the firm. Without 
sufficient controls and monitoring, investors will tend pay the same prices for ‘lemons’ and 
‘good’ companies. In this context, the European Public Real Estate Association’s (EPRA) Best 
Practice Recommendations (BPR) on financial reporting can be interpreted as an association-
based mechanism that is intended to improve corporate governance in the listed real estate 
sector and reduce the information risk borne by investors. The BPR guidance from EPRA 
attempts to standardise many financial performance metrics and to overcome discrepancies in 
reporting within the European real estate sector with the intention of improving the consistency 
and transparency in financial reporting.  In the US, in a study of the effect of similar industry 
initiative by NAREIT on reporting of Funds From Operation, Baik et al. (2008) found that 
industry guidance curtailed manager opportunistic reporting and investors perceived less 
manipulation and greater reliability. 
 
Such agency problems may have two effects on a firm’s stock price: they can influence 
expected cash flows accruing to investors and the cost of capital (Drobetz et al 2004). It is 
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expected that the extent of these effects will depend on the quality of governance. There is a 
substantial body of theoretical work to suggest that high quality financial information can 
reduce the cost of equity capital by increasing market liquidity or increasing the demand for a 
firm’s securities and by reducing investors’ information risk reducing shareholders’ monitoring 
and auditing costs. Whilst it is possible to hypothesise various linkages between governance 
and investment performance, empirical evidence or any effort towards ascertaining that is 
fraught with formidable challenges. Part of the difficulty relates to the fact that there are so 
many complex links in the causality chain. Does quality of governance affect investment 
performance or does quality of investment performance affect quality of governance? Is there 
a self-reinforcing pattern – does an improvement in business performance cause an 
improvement in governance which causes further improvements in business performance and 
so on? Alternatively, is there an omitted variable that is causing both improvements in both 
investment performance and governance performance? Such issues create difficult problems 
for researchers attempting to address the research question – All else equal, what is the effect 
of governance performance on investment performance? The other part is the severe lack of 
good-quality information and data on aspects of the whole process. Whilst quality of 
governance is at least measured for listed firms, there are few such measures for many other 
real estate investment organisations. 
 
A particular problem of research on corporate governance is the measurement of governance 
performance. Researchers have focussed on individual variables such as remuneration, board 
independence and insider ownership. There are also a number of composite indexes that 
attempt to measure corporate governance performance. Although governance can be quite 
broad in scope by itself, it is often bundled with a number of other activities (social and 
environmental) as a corporate attribute. It is then blended with other measures of corporate 
environmental and social performance to create Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) 
performance metrics. Whilst incorporating a large number of variables, in the listed sector the 
key category headings in corporate governance performance tend to focus on disclosure and 
auditing, remuneration, board structure and shareholder rights with numerous sub-categories. 
It is notable that a number of ’rating the ratings’ studies have found that different indices are 
corporate governance can be weakly (and sometimes negatively) correlated with each other, 
see Daines et al. (2010) and Brown and Caylor (2006). Variation between the various 
governance indices has been explained by a lack of consistency and theoretical justification for 
the inclusion and weighting of different variables in the different indices. Clearly, the quality 
of governance can then be difficult to measure. 
 
Inconsistency in empirical findings regarding the relationship between governance and 
corporate financial performance has been attributed to the range of metrics of corporate 
financial performance used. This does not include operational performance issues such as staff 
turnover or numbers of patents. A key problem is that there are large variations in the timescales 
in the transmission of the governance activities to different outcomes. Share prices can be 
affected by new information on governance almost instantaneously. However, the lags and 
processes between improvements in governance and improvements in profitability or turnover 
are likely to be much more lengthy and intricate. 
 
Governance and investment performance: some evidence 
 
Outside of the real estate sector, there is a voluminous empirical literature examining whether 
corporate ESG performance predicts corporate financial performance. Not surprisingly, it has 
produced an assortment of findings (for reviews see Orlitzky et al. 2003; Margolis et al. 2007; 
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van Beurden and Goessling 2008; Cai et al. 2011). While a detailed review of this literature is 
outside the scope of this chapter, it is clear that the topic is fraught with problems due to 
potential publication bias, differences in sampling periods and potential endogeneity of 
corporate ESG performance. Ruf et al. (2001) propose that causes of the identified lack of 
consistency in empirical studies include weak theoretical foundations, inadequate and 
inconsistent measurement of corporate ESG performance and corporate financial performance, 
weak methodology and sampling problems. In direct real estate, poor data is also a key issue. 
 
Supporting the theoretical predictions regarding information disclosure, there is also 
substantial empirical evidence that disclosure quality or earnings transparency lowers firms’ 
cost of capital. A number of studies have found a negative relation between various proxies for 
disclosure quality or earnings transparency and cost of equity capital (Botosan 1997; Botosan 
and Plumlee 2002; Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Barth and Landsman, 2003; Francis et al. 2004). 
There is also a fairly established body of research suggesting that discretionary disclosure 
lowers the cost of debt (Sengupta 1998), increases stock liquidity, stock performance and 
institutional ownership (Healy et al. 1999), increases analyst following (Lang and Lundholm 
1996) and decreases bid-ask spreads (Welker 1995). Essentially, transparency and disclosure 
in financial reporting and corporate governance may enable companies to signal quality in 
management and control. These signals may have a potential to lower agency costs by reducing 
conflicts of interest and investors’ costs of monitoring management and searching for 
information. 
 
Given the greater availability of data, it is to be expected that the vast majority of the empirical 
work on the relationship governance and performance has been in the listed real estate sector 
– and mainly on the US real estate listed sector. There is a body of work, most of which looks 
at US REITS on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance (Ghosh 
and Sirmans (2001 and 2003); Feng et al. 2005; Bauer et al. 2010; Bianco et al. 2007; Hartzell 
et al. 2008). In most of these studies, the researchers tended to focus on individual governance 
variables in order to identify which of the conventional corporate governance mechanisms, be 
it board size and independence, insider ownership, ownership concentration play a significant 
role in the governance structure of US REITS and the REITs performance and market value. 
Results have been mixed. Bauer et al. (2010) used an index of governance strength rating as 
proxy of corporate governance system and examine its relationship to the performance of US 
REITs. They failed to find that corporate governance had a significant influence on REITs’ 
performance. They suggest that, since the result contrasts with previous findings from studies 
of wider corporate performance, due to requirement to distribute at least 90% of operational 
earnings there are reduced agency costs for REITs and governance is, consequently a less 
important factor. 
 
In these studies, financial disclosure transparency by US REITs as one of the corporate 
governance variables was not explicitly examined, although it is an important governance 
issue. In the European listed sector, Muller et al. (2011) examined the effects of the adoption 
of IAS 40 on fair value reporting in the European listed real estate sector using bid-ask spreads 
as the dependent variable. They argued that this allowed them to assess perceived differences 
in information asymmetry across investors and thus directly measure the impact of fair value 
reporting on the information environment. Comparing mandatory provision of fair value 
information to voluntary provision, they found that mandatory adopters experienced a larger 
reduction in their information asymmetry as indicated by lower bid-ask spreads—following the 
adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards. This evidence is consistent with the 
improvement of the information environment for investors by mandatory provision of fair 
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values. However, they also found that differences in bid-ask spreads persisted. In the post-IFRS 
adoption period, firms that did not provide investment property fair values prior to IFRS 
continue to have higher bid-ask spreads than firms that did. This was interpreted as being 
consistent with investors continuing to have concerns about the reliability of mandatory 
adopters’ fair value disclosures due to the variation in those firms’ institutional structures and 
implementation. 
 
Kohl and Schaefers (2012) is probably the most relevant and robust previous empirical study 
of European listed property companies. They test whether the principal corporate governance 
mechanisms such as board size and independence, insider ownership, institutional ownership 
have significant effects on book-to-market ratio. They also include a disclosure variable, a self-
constructed transparency index based on the EPRA Best Practice Policy Recommendations as 
one of the significant corporate governance variable. They find a significant positive effect of 
better disclosure and firm value as measured by book-to-market ratio. However, it is notable 
that they do not include controls for variables that may affect book-to-market ratios such as 
focus on real estate development as opposed to investment assets. 
 
Conclusion 
 
One of the main difficulties of analysing governance in the context of real estate markets is that 
it is such a broad, multi-dimensional, even nebulous, concept. Perhaps it is too obvious a point 
to make but it may be worth reiterating that problems of misaligned incentives, moral hazard 
and conflicts of interest are far from unique to commercial real estate markets and tend to raise 
difficult issues for all public and private sector organisations. Governance in this commercial 
context is mainly about identifying and mitigating the potential costs of such problems. In 
different contexts, different emphasis tends to be given to different aspects of governance. Even 
when the concept of governance is explicitly defined in order to evaluate its quality, there are 
major challenges in then measuring and quantifying it. In a commercial real estate investment 
market characterised by chains of intermediaries and typically outsourced support services such 
as brokerage, appraisers, asset managers, and fund administration, mitigating principal-agent 
costs can become a key business performance issue. 
 
A number of features seem to be at the heart of the concept of good governance. Broadly the 
focus is on the protection of the interests of ‘principals’ such as investors, trustees, and clients 
from self-interested behaviour by ‘agents’ such as fund managers and service providers. 
Aspects of governance such as fairness and equity are essentially concerned with normative 
ethics. The typical stress on communication, transparency and disclosure can be interpreted in 
the context of mitigating problems of information asymmetry. The emphasis of codes, 
guidance, procedures and processes that are related to the identification and management of 
moral hazards. Robust governance should then produce reductions in operational risk, 
improvements in quality assurance and decreased potential for reputational damage. A whole 
range of approaches to oversight and formal and informal regulation are used. Oversight can 
typically involve joint decision-making with peers, audits and independent directors. 
Procedures and processes are often governed by professional or internal codes of practice 
and/or guidance. There are then strong grounds for expecting a positive relationship between 
good governance and business performance. The level of disclosure is expected to be 
negatively associated with information risks and monitoring costs for investors. Robust risk 
management procedures tend to be regarded positively by investors since they should make the 
organisation more resilient to external shocks. Fairness and equity with key stakeholders is 
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expected to build trust with stakeholders with the literature highlighting the multitude of 
benefits that trust can create for firms. 
 
Clearly there are good reasons to expect a positive relationship between governance and 
business performance. However, even where data are available, there have been major 
challenges in investigating the relationship between governance and business or investment 
performance. Given the multitude of factors that determine the performance of a listed 
company and the often intricate linkages between these factors, it can be difficult to isolate the 
effect of a single variable such as governance. It is also worth bearing in mind that governance 
metrics are usually based upon a composite measure of a range of attributes such as the quality 
of disclosure and board independence. It is notable that different governance metrics can 
produce quite different rankings. Perhaps more problematically, in private commercial real 
estate investment markets many of the governance issues have remained relatively 
unscrutinised in terms of research. 
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